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CIVIL SAFEGUARDS BEFORE COURTS-MARTIAL
By STANLEY LAW SABEL*
T HE United States is now facing a military effort which will
result at least in an enlarged army composed in the main of
conscripts. The Selective Training Service Act of 19401 fairly
insures that men called into the armed forces through its opera-
tion will represent a cross section of the population.2 Those called
will thus be average Americans accustomed to civil life and to
the protection afforded by democratic processes; they will not
necessarily be those most suited by temperament to military dis-
cipline. The need from this point of view of applying the military
law, to which they will be subject from the time they are inducted
into service,3 in such a way as to take away as few as possible of
their civil safeguards is apparent.
On the other hand there are forces in the world today that
increase greatly the tempo of warfare. The speed of modern in-
vasion is not entirely a matter of mechanical process. The blitz-
krieg preys on decreased resistance by making use of every pos-
sible device to undermine the will to fight. Effective discipline is
more necessary than ever to prevent such destruction of morale.
The needs of an effective fighting force on the one hand and
the essential elements of democracy on the other are thus the
interests which must be balanced by our military law. This law is
the subdivision of military jurisdiction which deals with the in-
ternal control of the military establishment.4 The other two sub-
divisions, namely military government of occupied territory,6
*Although the writer is a Reserve Officer in the United States Army
the views herein expressed are in all respects his own ani do not necessarily
represent those of the Army.
154 Stat. at L.
-Idem sec. 10.
:ldem sec. 11.
41 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (14th ed. 1896) 341 note (a).
Frazier v. Anderson, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 2F. (2d) 36; Crouch v. United
States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 348.
'See a discussion of the three classifications in Hatcher, Martial Law
and Habeas Corpus, (1940) 46 W. Va. L. Q. 187, and Ex parte Milligan,(1866) 4 Wall. (U.S.) 2, 127, 18 L. Ed. 281.
GSuch government generally makes broad use of the existing civil courts
reserving to the military tribunals the government of the military forces and
authority over those acts by civilians which affect or impair the success of
the military objective. Jones, Military Occupation of Alien Territory in
Time of Peace, in Problems of Peace and War, 9 Transactions of the
Grotius Society (1923) 149.
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and control by martial law of the civil population- are outside the
scope of this article, except in so far as civilians do some acts
affecting the armed forces, such as committing certain types of
contempt of military tribunals,' or are charged with a wartime
offense, such as acting as a spy.9 Courts-martial administer mili-
tary law, and in the case of the army" are governed by the Ar-
ticles of War" and the Manual for Courts-Martial prescribed by
executive order. 1- The former, codified in 19201" in substantially
their World War I form, and the latter, practically unchanged
since its issuance in 1927,14 should be reconsidered in the light of
present-day conditions.
As we shall see, courts-martial apply most of the safeguards
with which we are familiar in Anglo-American common criminal
law. These safeguards in many cases balance the interests of the
innocent against the future victims of the guilty.15 Are our tradi-
tional views justified when whole nations may be the victims of
the Quislings, Petains and Mosleys? Yet in streamlining our mili-
tary procedure we must not lose sight of the essential rights of
the individual.
Of the fifteen main safeguards surrounding civilian criminals,
which we shall take up, only two need no discussion; the rest
7Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall, (U.S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281; Pollock,
What Is Martial Law?, (1902) 18 Law Q. Rev. 157. Its constitutionaljustification is necessity. Luther v. Borden, (1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 12
L. Ed. 581.
SThis is so in peace as well as war time but only as to certain types of
direct contempt; the statute limits a court-martial's power to punish for
contempt to punishment of one "who uses menacing words, signs, or
gestures in its presence, or who disturbs its proceedings by any riot or
disorder . . ." 41 Stat. at L. 793, 10 U. S. C. A. sec. 1503, 10 F. C. A. sec.
1503, Article of War No. 32. cf. United States v. Praeger, (D. Tex. 1907)
149 Fed. 474 and, 41 Stat. at L. 791, 10 U. S. C. A. sec. 1494, 10 F. C. A.
sec. 1494, Article of War No. 23 as to punishment as a federal crime for a
civilian to refuse to testify before a court-martial.9United States v. M'Donald, (E.D. N.Y. 1920) 265 Fed. 754 appeal
dismissed per stipulation (1921) 256 U. S. 705, (1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 535.
65 L. Ed. 1180.
"oSimilar articles providing for the government of the Navy are found
in 12 Stat. at L. 600, 34 U. S. C. A. sec. 1120, 34 F. C. A. see. 1200.
"Set forth by 41 Stat. at L. 787 et sequi and amendments thereto as
chapter 36 of Title 10 of the U. S. C. A. (secs, 1472 to 1593), 10 F. C. A.
secs. 1472 to 1593. Hereinafter cited: A. W. No. - their statute and
code citations are readily determined.
"-Prescribed by President Coolidge November 29, 1927, pursuant to
chapter II of 41 Stat. at L. 759. Hereinafter cited: M. C. M. par -.
"3See note 11 supra.
14See note 12 supra.
1"So, too, reform of the individual is often placed above protection of
society. See for example, Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law,
(1940) 49 Yale L. J. 987.
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have been or we think might be modified as they are applied by
military courts.
1. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
The twin requirements of all judicial process, 6 notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, are substantially the
same as in civil courts. 17 No one would advocate courts-martial
without notice and hearing. Even the Russian trials had as
much."5
2. CONFRONTATION
The requirement that one be confronted by his accusers in
the case of courts-martial is subject to one large exception. De-
positions, in cases where a witness is absent due to certain stated,
causes, may be used by the prosecution in cases "not capital."'"
The phrase "not capital" has been interpreted as meaning not only
cases where capital punishment is not authorized by law, but also
cases where crimes capital by law are not so punishable by pres-
ent regulations.'0 Thus most cases in time of peace are triable
by deposition. Yet in wartime, when it becomes more important
not to remove witnesses from important commands or duties, the
use of the deposition would be less because of the greater number
of crimes which become capital. This can be illustrated by taking
a simple case of a soldier assaulting or willfully disobeying his
superior officer. Under the applicable Article of War this is punish-
able by death or such punishment as a court-martial may direct.2 '
It is thus a capital offense. However punishment which may be
applied under present regulations is limited to a maximum of
'
6 Notice and hearing are viewed as essential attributes of administrative
action when such action partakes of a judicial nature. McDermott, To What
Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies Be Reviewable by the
Courts, (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 453.
17M. C. M. pars. 55, 75c, 76.
"Such defendants as reached trial were present and allowed to address
the court. Mann, Totalitarian Justice: Trial of Bukharid, Rykov, Yagoda,
et al, (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 970. If as contended by some writers (See
Gunther, Inside Europe (War ed. 1940) 553) the real trial in the U. S. S. R.
is the proceeding preliminary to the indictment, in form similar to that
followed by the former French Republic, even then the accused is notified
and allowed to be present at this type of inquisitional procedure. See Keedy,
The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France, (1940) 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 385, 692. (Part V Investigation by the Juge D'Instruction).
"'A. W. 25. Although there is no constitutional objection thereto only
a few states have statutes authorizing depositions to be taken and used by
the prosecution. Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) see. 1398.
213M. C. M. par. 119.
21A. W. 64.
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five years confinement at hard labor, dishonorable discharge and
forfeiture of all pay and allowances due and to become due .'-
Thus while this maximum limitation is in effect depositions may
be used by the prosecution at a trial involving this offense. Upon
the outbreak of war or grave public emergency, the maximum
limitation no longer would be in effect ;23 the offense would thus
become capital and not properly triable by deposition on the part
of the prosecution over the objection of the accused. We do not
believe that decreasing the use of depositions in emergencies is
the way to deal with the problem. It would be better to allow
the prosecution to use depositions when necessary in all cases in
time of war.
3. PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE OATH
An oath is administered to witnesses in the usual manner.24
Likewise a witness who does not believe in the sanctity of an oath
may affirm.2 5 Each witness takes the oath 2 or affirmation2 7 sep-
arately from the others. In this respect the practice differs from
that prevailing in some states of swearing witnesses en masse.
Oaths or affirmations are required in each case of the mem-
bers of the court and the personnel of the prosecution as a requi-
site to service.2 s This is in addition to any oath that may have
been taken on voir dire examination as to their competency.20 It is
like renewing an oath of office. This repetition of the official oath,
especially when the same court tries several cases, seems need-
lessly time consuming. As pageantry it may make the accused not
only get but also feel that he is getting a fair trial. To thus as-
suage feeling at the expense of time, though possibly trivial, is
waste which should be eliminated.
The final aspect of the oath as one of the pillars of the hear-
say rule we reserve for treatment in the next sub-topic in which
we touch on this exclusionary rule of evidence.
4. OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE
The technical federal rule 30 which limits cross examination.
except such as seeks to discredit the witness, to matters having
22M. C. M. par. 104 c.
23M. C. M. par. 104. The provision prescribing the maximum punish-
ment Ro provides.24A. W. 19.
25A. W. 19.
26M. C. M. Appendix 6.
27M. C. M. Appendix 6.
28A. W. 19; M. C. M. par. 95.
2
9A. W. 19; M. C. M. par. 95.
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a bearing upon the testimony of that particular witness on direct
examination is followed by courts-martial. 31 Without wishing to
engage in a detailed discussion of conflicting rules of evidence,
we nevertheless prefer the more liberal rule which allows cross-
examination as to all matters relevant to the case.32 It does away
with such questions as when does a witness become artificially a
witness for the side not calling him so as to "bind" that side
by his answer, and its tactical corrollary of when to open up cer-
tain issues on direct. 3 In short it favors bringing out all pertinent
facts regardless of which side has the cleverer advocate. These
thoughts seem especially pertinent in trials military. Purely mili-
tary offenses are apt to have tvo main issues, one the applicable
orders, and two, what was done. Technical questions as to the
extent that witnesses on one issue may be cross-examined on the
other are apt to arise. Though this question, like others relating
to the admissibility of evidence, is decided for the court by the
law member thereof 34 it offers opportunity for delay, and the law
member, though preferably a member of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department, is not necessarily so2 It makes one more ques-
tion to be kept in mind by the reviewing authority. Furthermore
the trial judge advocate and the defense counsel, especially the
latter, and especially when in combat zone, are not necessarily
skilled military or civil lawyers. Without further laboring the
point we feel the simpler rule allowing cross-examination as to
any relevant issue in a case should be adopted.
The safeguard afforded by cross-examination in testing the
credibility of testimony is generally viewed as the main founda-
tion of the hearsay rule." The hearsay rule and its exceptions are
fully applicable before courts-martial. 37 Yet the rationale of the
exclusionary rules has been placed on broader grounds than cross-
examination; "the admissibility of evidence varies directly with
its probative force and the absence of better evidence on the point,
and inversely with its prejudicial effect and tendency to occupy
306 Wigrnore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1886.3"..C. M. par. 121b.
32VWigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1888; Note, (1937) 5 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 116.
3 3Wigrnore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1888; Note, (1937) 5 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 116.
34A. W. 31; M. C. M. par. Sld.
$5A. W. 8.
3OWigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1362.
37M. C. M. par. 113.
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time."3" This broad recognition of the necessity as an important
reason for the exceptions 9 might well be extended to wartime
conditions.
The chance, greatly magnified by war, that death will make a
witness unavailable should be recognized. The same condition,
such as a sudden disorganization of the lines, as causes the demise
of the witness may make the need for enforcing discipline the
more imperative. Elsewhere in the combat zone, even though out-
side of the actual theatre of operations, casualties will occur with
a frequency that is bound to affect the availability of witnesses.
A rule that would make admissible in evidence all hearsay state-
ments by witnesses since deceased should be adopted. 40  The cir-
cumstances surrounding the utterance would of course affect its
weight. Possibly some limit should be made as to how far capital
punishment should follow convictions based on uncorroborated
hearsay. Nevertheless hearsay evidence is probative,'- and in
many cases might be corroborative evidence determinative of the
outcome. Once the rule admitting such testimony became gener-
ally known throughout the armed forces, it might even make for
greater care in at least official extra-judicial assertions.
5. GRAND JURY INDICTMENT AND JURY TRIAL
The exemption of "cases arising in the land and naval forces"
from the requirement as to presentment and indictment by a grand
jury together with proceeding without petit jury are probably
the chief characteristics of military law.
42
'sChafee, Jr., The Process of the Law, 1919-1922 Evidence II, (1922)
35 Harv. L. Rev. 428, 433. See James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational
Scheme of Evidence, (1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 788.
395 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 1421.
40Massachusetts, General Laws (Ter. ed. 1931) ch. 233, sec. 65 pro-
vides: "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evi-
dence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before
the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the
declarant." See critical analysis approving this provision based upon ques-
tionnaires sent practicing attorneys, The Law of Evidence, Some Proposals
for Its Reform (Commonwealth Fund, 1927).
41James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence,
(1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 788.42The exception in the case of the grand jury is in the fifth amendment
of the United States constitution. In the case of the petit jury guaranteed
in the sixth amendment for all "criminal prosecutions" it has been held that
"the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the sixth amendment is limited to
persons who were subject to indictment under the fifth, which does not apply
to cases arising in the land and naval forces." In re Waidman, (D. Maine
1930) 42 F. (2d) 239, 240; Kahn v. Anderson, (1921) 255 U. S. 1, 41 Sup.
Ct. 224, 65 L. Ed. 469.
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Just as some states have substituted information of the state's
attorney for indictment, 3 there is an army substitute, namely an
impartial investigation.'44 The accused is allowed to be present at
such investigation,' and is given a chance to cross-examine wit-
nesses against him and present evidence in his own behalf.' 6
It is largely this dispensing with grand and petit jury action
that prevents military law from extending to civilians outside of
the actual combat zone within the continental United States.4 7
Some progress was made during World War I in getting away
from this restriction as to purely military offenses. " 8 Further liber-
alization of this restriction in cases of purely military offense or
recognition of a broader combat zone wherein civilians are sub-
ject to military law will be necessary if war comes to our shore.49
As the constitution does not extend in toto to occupied terri-
4 31-em Woon v. Oregon, (1913) 229 U. S. 586, 33 Sup. Ct. 783, 57 L.
Ed. 1340; People v. Bird, (1931) 212 Cal. 632, 300 Pac. 23.
44A. W. 70; M. C. M. par. 35.
-1A. W. 70; M. C. M. par. 35; cf. practice before grand jury in civilian
criminal law where it is held that the person under investigation has no
right to appear and testify. United States v. Bolles, (D. Mo. 1913) 209
Fed. 682.40A. W. 70.
47While these privileges exist martial law with the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is the only way they can be abridged. This is nor-
mally "confined to the locality of actual war." Ex parte Milligan, (1866)
4 Wall, (U.S.) 2, 127, 18 L. Ed. 281.4OUnited States v. M'Donald, (E.D. N. Y. 1920) 265 Fed. 754). (Spy-
ing-the defendant, however, was a German naval officer who had come to
the United States in November, 1916), cf. (1918) 31 Ops. Atty. Gen. 356:
"A person apprehended upon United States territory not under martial
law, who had not entered any camp, fortification, or other military premises
of the United States and who had not come through the fighting lines or field
of military operations, cannot be tried by a military tribunal, and to such a
case sec. 1343 of the Revised Statutes and A. W. 82 cannot constitutionally
be applied."
4 0ne of the lessons taught by this [World War I] war is that the
ocean is no longer a barrier or an insurance against America's being in-
volved in European wars. She cannot now become an asylum of safety for
spies. This War was not carried out by naval and military forces only.
Intrigues played a large part. New and useful methods of communication
with the enemy were devised and in existence which did not exist in any
other wars. Wireless telegraphy, signaling by light, the successful use of
carrier pigeons, were found to be useful instruments of warfare by the
Germans. These methods of operation and assistance created a greater
danger flowing from the activities of spies. Their existence in our midst
helped propaganda for unrest, suspicion, created doubts of victory, and made
it possible to place bombs on ships sailing from this port" reasons ad-
vanced by Manton, J. in United States v. M'Donald, (E.D. N.Y. 1920)
265 Fed. 754, appeal dismissed per stipulation, (1921) 256 U. S. 705, 41
Sup. Ct. 530, 65 L. Ed. 1180, for holding New York within the field of
active operations in World War I.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tory, 0 dispensing with the jury will not affect necessary applica-
tion of military law incidental to military government.
Realistically considered, a general court-martial consisting
of at least five members has some of the characteristics of a petit
jury. They determine facts and in this respect they perform
the functions of jurors. However the differences are apparent, as
they determine sentence, have a vote on some interlocutory mat-
ters and, of course, are a more expert homogeneous body of men
than is generally found in the jury box. The analogy is mhore
closely to that of a multi-judge court sitting without a jury. 1
Actually they are like the various fact finding boards found in
other phases of administrative law. This constitutes added reason
applying throughout our whole discussion for not surrounding
them with rules of procedure and evidence which are largely off-
shoots of the jury system.5 2 Furthermore it would thus seem as
noted later on that as experts greater finality could safely be given
their decision than is given to that of a petit jury.51 As military
jurisprudence antedated other phases of administrative law, it is
probably an historical accident that so far has prevented the
growth of rules based on such considerations."4
We think greater use of administrative ability could be made
by having certain officers fitted for this duty sit almost continu-
ously as a court in the case of a field army or other large com-
mand. They would thus become more expert in the judicial pro-
cess, thus enabling their actions to be made more summarily as
necessity demanded.
6. HABEAS CORPUS
There is no provision in army procedure whereby the accused
himself can summarily test before a military tribunal the legality
of his detention. To this extent the writ of habeas corpus may be
5OBalzac v. Porto Rico, (1922) 258 U. S. 298, 42 Sup. Ct. 343, 66 L.
Ed. 627.51Page, Military Law-A Study in Comparative Law, (1919) 32 Harv.
L. Rev. 349, 372, sees an analogy between the court-martial and the judex
of Roman law.52See Stephan, The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should be
Bound by Rules of Evidence, (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 630.53See McDermott, To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administra-
tive Bodies Be Reviewable by the Courts?, (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 453.
5
"This is especially odd in view of the fact that the powers delegated
to the secretary of war by the River and Harbor Act were among the
first examples of administrative law in this country recognized as such by
the courts, Union Bridge Co. v. United States, (1907) 204 U. S. 364, 27
Sup. Ct. 367, 51 L. Ed. 523; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States,
(1909) 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 367, 54 L. Ed. 408.
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viewed as suspended as to persons subject to trial by courts-
martial.
There are several provisions which take the place of the writ
and effectively assure speedy trial and prevent unlawful detention.
The Articles of War provide that where the accused is in arrest
or confinement immediate steps should be taken to bring him to
trial or to dismiss the charges." It is a military offense punish-
able by court-martial to delay unnecessarily investigating or carry-
ing a case to final conclusion." The commanding officer is re-
quired to forward the charges to the authority which appointed
the court within eight days if practicable, and if not practicable to
report the reason for the delay." In view of the necessity of
soundness of discipline in any effective fighting force, there is
no need to give the accused further rights, as these provisions are
ample for his protection without interfering with effective han-
dling of emergencies.
State courts are without jurisdiction to inquire into the legal-
ity of restraint where it appears that the custody is by virtue of
the authority of the United States.' This rule arising from dual
sovereignfy received early recognition, and the mere announce-
ment that the detention is because of the authority of the United
States is sufficient answer to any attempt to exercise the authority
of the writ."
Where the writ is issued from any United States court a re-
turn will have to be made,"0 but the army detention in the usual
case would be viewed as valid. To this extent the writ of habeas
corpus still exists, but except in extremely rare cases"' would test
nothing other than whether or not the person detained was subject
to military law. Even this limited interference should not be al-
lowed in time of great emergency.
"A. W. 70 paragraph 4.
,1A. W. 70 par. 4.
"*A. W. 70 par. 4.
5SAbleman v. Booth, (1858) 21 How. (U.S.) 506, 16 L. Ed. 169.
60Tarble's Case, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 397, 20 L. Ed. 587.
*OThe suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course, and on the
return made to it the court decides whether the party applying is denied
the right of proceeding any further. Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall.
(U.S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281; 14 Stat. at L. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
455, 28 F. C. A. sec. 455.
G'Such as Kahn v. Anderson, (1921) 255 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. 224,
65 L. Ed. 469. The court on habeas corpus considered the competency to
sit of the members of the court-martial as having a bearing on a possible
lack of jurisdiction.
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7. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The main protection in the privilege against double jeopardy
need not be questioned for our purposes. This protection applies
in trials before courts-martial much as in ordinary criminal trials, -
and its abolition would seem to do little to make discipline more
effective.
The army plea of former jeopardy is affected by our federal
system of government. Thus the same act can constitute a crime
against the state and against the United States. Court-martial trial
gives immunity against conviction by United States courts and
vice versa, but is not affected by and does not affect state trial. 3
This is rather silly, and the extent of the privilege should not
depend upon such accidents of locality. 4 Any thorough-going re-
vision of our military law should consider making this privilege
more uniform. We think it would be best to apply it only as
between army courts, and not let trial by court-martial be affected
by or affect earlier or later trials even in United States courts.
This is so that minor civil irregularities may not affect a soldier's
use in emergencies, and yet a minor military punishment which
still leaves him available for service should not, as we view it,
exempt him forever from the civil courts.
8. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right of the accused to counsel is preserved in trial by
courts-martial in a form only slightly different from that prevail-
ing in civil law generally.6 As in any criminal trial the accused
may have civil counsel of his own selection if he provides this
himself. 7
Military counsel (not necessarily a lawyer or member of the
Judge Advocates General's Department) selected by the accused
6-A. W. 40; M. C. M. par. 68.
63A. C. M. par. 68.
34See Lerner, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offense,
(1937) 7 Brook. L. Rev. 79; Grant, Penal Ordinances and the Guaranty
Against Double Jeopardy, (1937) 25 Geo. L. J. 293.63The answer to the constitutional question is the same as with that for
jury trial namely that constitutional guarantees only apply to persons who
are entitled to indictment under the fifth amendment. See note 42, supra.
The power is derived from the grant to Congress in article I, section 8
of power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces."66A. W. 17; M. C. M. pars, 43, 44 and 45.
67"Civilian counsel will not be provided at the expense of the govern-
ment." M. C. M. par. 45a.
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will be provided only "if such counsel be reasonably available.""5
Determination of the availability of counsel is left to the officer
who has authority to detail the person selected.69 Decision as to
availability is subject to revision by appeal to the superior of the
officer making the decision.70
The defense counsel (and assistant defense counsel where trial
is by general court-martial) is always appointed for the full term
of the court.71 Such counsel is in many respects analogous to the
public defender appointed in many communities in that he is
available in all cases.7 2 However, the military protection goes
further in that if the accused has individual counsel the defense
counsel appointed for the court will if the accused so desires act
as associate counsel.
7 3
In serious criminal cases most states as well as the federal
government have provisions for counsel assigned by the court
where a criminal defendant is not otherwise represented. Other
than the provision for defense and assistance defense counsel (who
are not necessarily lawyers or officers in the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department) and military counsel if available, there is in
military law no provision for assigned counsel at government
expense, no matter how grave the case. The partial relaxation of
the right of counsel seems necessary to meet military exigencies.71
The only respect in which the provisions as to counsel need re-
examination is in connection with the right of an accused to ap-
peal decisions as to the availability of military counsel requested.
Although ordinarily this is not very important, in times of great
emergency it would offer an accused an added chance for delay.76
By proper selection of the counsel requested, an accused could se-
cure the right of appeal, if his request were denied, to a distant
68A. W. 17.M'M. C. M. par. 45a.
70AJ. C. M. par. 45a.71A. W. 1172Goldman, Public Defenders for the Poor in Criminal Cases, (1940)
26 Va. L. Rev. 275.
73AI. C. M. par. 45a.
-MUnited States v. Hiatt, (D. Pa. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 545.
V'Relaxing the safeguard in the sixth amendment of the constitution isjustified by the power of Congress over the armed forces. See Note 65, supra.7G"Application, through the usual channels, for the detail of a person
selected by the accused as military counsel may be made by the accused or
anyone on his behalf. When the application reaches an officer who is au-
thorized to make the detail and order any necessary travel, he will act
thereon. His decision is subject to revision by his immediate superior on
appeal by or on behalf of the accused." M. C. M. par. 45a. [Italics added.]
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officer from whom the command for which the court was appointed
might be isolated. We think such appeals should not be allowed
in time of great emergency.
9. CO,PULSORY PROCESS TO OBTAIN DEFENSE WITNESSES
The provisions governing compulsory process for the attend-
ance of defense witnesses closely parallel those found in criminal
procedure generally.7 7 The only important difference lies in the
fact that the trial judge advocate through whom the defense se-
cures the issuance of the necessary subpoenas may sometimes re-
fuse to issue this process. Thus where the proposed testimony is
immaterial or unnecessary, or a deposition would fully answer
the purpose with less expense and inconvenience, the compulsory
process may not be had." The ultimate decision is for the appoint-
ing authority before the court convenes and thereafter for the
court. 79 Inasmuch as the cases in which a deposition may be taken
include that where a witness because of reasonable cause is unable
to appear and testify in person,80 this exception to the issuance of
compulsory process takes care of any military necessity.
In one respect the accused before a court-martial is fortunate
in that process for the attendance of witness runs to any part of
the United States, its territories and possessions.$' This safeguard
is thus as broad as it could possibly be, subject to the necessary
exception that takes care of military exigencies. We could leave
it in its present form.
77A. W. 22; M. C. M. par. 97.
78L.% C. M. par. 97a. The accused is given greater rights than before the
typical federal administrative agency where the board is usually given greater
discretion than this. See Note, Subpoenas and Due Process in Administra-
tive Hearings, (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 847.
79Ibid.
SOA. W. 25.
81A. W. 22. In the federal courts in spite of the sixth amendment of the
United States constitution it is only a "person who is indicted of treason or
other capital crime" who has the same absolute rights as the prosecution
namely to have process for the attendance of witnesses run into any district.
1 Stat. at L. 118, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 563, 18 F. C. A. see. 563 which gives
such accused the rights given the prosecution by 42 Stat. at L. 848, 28 U. S.
C. A. sec. 654, 28 F. C. A. sec. 654. Other defendants are left to their rights
under the constitution such as it may be. 9 Hughes, Federal Practice, Juris-
diction and Procedure (1931) sec. 7100. The states generally have gotten no
further than the using of compulsion for the return of witness wished by the
prosecution. See Snyder, Compelling the Attendance of Witnesses From
Without the State in Criminal Trials, (1937) 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 717.
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10. SEPARATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF COURT AND PROSECUTOR
The modern innovation in administrative law of having the
same individual or body act as both prosecutor and judge has been
applied in only a few situations in connection with courts-martial.
The impartial investigation (analogous to an information or in-
dictment by a grand jury) which precedes the trial is conducted
by a single officer who both calls and examines witnesses and de-
termines whether or not to recommend trial.s 2 Likewise, in the
case of cases on review after conviction, the same body often acts
as court and counsel.8 3 These reviews, as we will see, follow auto-
matically, and are generally without benefit of counsel either for
the prosecutor or the accused. Finally, summary courts-martial
consist of a single officer acting as prosecutor, judge and jury.8'
These courts deal only with extremely minor offenses. As they
cannot order confinement in excess of one month and have juris-
diction over only certain enlisted men in the lower ranks, they are
not important for our purposes. 85 They are an adjunct to disci-
pline rather than tribunals for the consideration of major offenses,
and as such we have disregarded them throughout this article.
Our attention has been confined to special, and in the main to
general courts-martial. These, of course, have separate trial judge
advocates who act as prosecutors, and in the case of a general
courts-martial one or more assistant trial judge advocates.8 6 Fur-
ther provisions are made to secure separation of the two func-
tions by prohibiting members of the court, trial judge advocates
and their assistants and also the defense counsel from acting, in
the same case, as the staff judge advocate who advises the review-
ing or confirming authority.87
Whatever justification there may be in other fields for com-
bining the functions of prosecutor and judge where only a limited
number of experts are available for a large task, 88 there seems to
92A. V. 70, M. C. MA. par. 35.
1 M. C. M. pars. 87 and 88.
.XA. WV. 10; M. C. M. par. 5. The court may also be the appointing
authority and accuser. Id a.
A5A. W. 14. They may also order restriction to limits up to three months
and forfeiture or detention of up to two-thirds of one month's pay. Persons
above private first class in the army are exempt from summary courts-
martial except noncommissioned officers below technical sergeant may be so
tried if they do not object or if such trial be ordered by an officer com-
petent to order trial by general court-martial. M. C. M. par. 16.
SGA. W. 11.
87A. W. 11.
SSLandis, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, (1940) 53 Harv. L.
Rev. 1077, 1080.
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be no reason for extending this innovation further into military
law. It would certainly prevent an accused from feeling he was
getting a fair trial, 9 and seems to us much like the Gestapo at its
worst.9 0 At any rate, possibly because we do not think human
nature makes one capable of acting efficiently as prosecutor and
judge in the same case, we think it would be unfortunate if this
joinder of functions should penetrate further in military legal
procedure.
11. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATION
The historic Anglo-Saxon privilege against being forced to
give evidence against one's self and its corollary exempting a
criminal defendant from testifying applies in toto in trials by a
courts-martial.9 1
As applied to witnesses we pass the question as within the
realm of abstract jurisprudence. The privilege, in reducing the
terror of the witness chair, may well be productive of more evi-
dence than would be forthcoming by forcing answer to incrimi-
nating question. 2 Even with witnesses it might be noted that in
a closely knit unit like an army command the mere claim of the
privilege is apt to result in investigation, thus affecting somewhat
the scope of the protection afforded by the privilege 3
8OSee Bell, Let Me Find the Facts, (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 551: "Gil-
bert & Sullivan immortalized a device like that when the lord chancellor in
Iolanthe passed on his own application to marry his ward. Those old-
fashioned writers thought the idea funny. Today it is apparently a device
of efficiency. But it may still be thought that the arrangement is not a
sound one. .. ."9OAfter weighing the arguments against this phase of administrative law
Dean Landis concludes "The necessity for coordinating enforcement with
policy is still so urgent as not to lead lightly toward the divorcement of
these functions." Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 106. Yet no
greater example of "coordinating enforcement with policy" can be found
than the totalitarian government. The Gestapo combines prosecutor and
judge for a full coordination of enforcement with policy. See Gunther, Inside
Europe (War ed. 1940) 553.91A. W. 24; M. C. M. pars. 120d and 122b.92
"The witness-stand is today sufficiently a place of annoyance and
dread. The reluctance to enter it must not be increased. Every influence
which tends to suppress the sources of truth must be removed. To remove
all limits of inquiry into the secrets of the persons who have no stake in
the cause but can furnish help in its investigation, would be to add to the
motives which now sufficiently dispose them to evade their duty." 8 Wig-
more, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 2251-1.(a).93While it is not settled in military law, a court-martial would prob-
ably follow the rule generally prevailing in this country as to ordinary wit-
nesses against drawing inferences from the claim of the privilege. Wigniore,
Evidence (3d ed. 1940) see. 2272 notes the difficulty of the triers of fact
ignoring the operation of their own mind where they too pass on the claim
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As applied to an accused in time of war the privilege against
self-incrimination should be critically examined. We think it
would not be requiring too much to require a person under sus-
picion of espionage, or who is otherwise charged with the com-
mission of a wartime offense helpful to the enemy, to explain his
action." Mere lack of proof should not, through solicitude for the
rights of the individual, endanger the safety of all those whom the
armed forces are defending. Realistically speaking, the third de-
gree practices of the guard house could be reduced by allowing
questioning in the court room.
The manner of relaxing the privilege should be95 carefully con-
sidered, namnely whether it should be relaxed at the impartial in-
vestigation preceding trial,9 6 at the trial or merely in respect to
inferences drawn from the accused's failure to testify. We think
that to make the relaxation effective it would have to relate to
all three. Some limitations in inquiry into offenses other than
those charged would probably have to be made in order to make
the privilege afforded witnesses effective. 97
Necessities of war should be sufficient answer to any consti-
tutional objection.95 The matter might be viewed as sufficiently
important to consider an amendment if necessary. If a technical
approach is desired, the term "criminal case" in the fifth amend-
ment could be interpreted as not including trial by court-martial,
of the privilege. (The actual ruling on this as "an objection to the admissi-
bility of evidence offered during the trial" is made by the law member.
A. W. 31. The court, however, is present and fully conversant with what is
going on.)
04"No law-abiding person can be erroneously convicted of a crime be-
cause he is compelled to disclose what evidence, if any, he controls with
respect to the crime." Carman, A Plea for Withdrawal of Constitutional
Privilege From the Criminal, (1938) 22 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 200.
-"'... the remedy for the third degree and its derivatives is to satisfy
the reasonable demands of the police and the prosecutors for an investiga-
tion of suspected persons and thus do away with the excuse for extra-legal
questionings.
I submit that there should be express provision for a legal examination
of suspects or accused persons before a magistrate; that those to be examined
should be allowed to have counsel present to safeguard their rights; that
provisions should be made for taking down the evidence so as to guarantee
accuracy." Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of
Crime, (1934) 24 Jour. Crim. L. and Proced. 1014.
DOThis is the continental method that Pound calls "an inquisitorial sys-
tem of prosecution." See Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in
France, (1940) 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 385, 692.
97Under present court-martial procedure, where one accused of a num-
ber of offenses testifies as to but part of them, he cannot be asked about the
others on cross-examination. M. C. M. par. 121b.
9sIf the privilege is only relaxed in war time.
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at least for war offenses, and possibly for some other offenses so
triable. Regardless of the legal approach, 09 the result should be
achieved whereby in times of war or emergency persons subject to
military law cannot avoid answering questions as to their actions.
12. DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED
As provided in the Manual for Courts-Martial, the court, to
convict, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused. 00 This adoption without sanction of statute of the
rule generally prevailing in criminal trial deserves careful atten-
tion.
The Manual defines this degree of proof so as to require the
exclusion of every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.10 1 In
spite of this apparently unconscious adoption of the strictest defi-
nition, 10 2 the Manual description on the whole resembles the type
of charge on the burden of proof which the prosecution might
request in a criminal case.10 3 Yet this straining to define away the
9 9The constitutional problem should be no greater than with jury trial
or double jeopardy. As to these see notes 65 and 75 supra.
This privilege has never been considered as within the fourteenth
amendment; See Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U. S. 319,
325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288; "immunity from compulsory self-
incrimination . . . might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as
in the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the im-
munity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope or
destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to give protec-
tion against torture, physical or mental. Justice, however, would not perish
if the accused were subject to the duty to respond to orderly inquiry."
Fraenkel, One Hundred -and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights, (1939)
23 M INNESOTA LAW REvIEw 719, 722.
100M. C. M. par. 78.0 1
"The meaning of the rule is that the proof must be such as to ex-
clude not every hypothesis or possibility of innocence but any fair and
rational hypothesis except that of guilt... !1. C. M. par. 78.
'10 2See Commonwealth v. Costley, (1875) 118 Mass. 1, 24. This "hypo-
thesis" theory is adopted only in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois and Massachu-
setts. Wharton, Evidence in Criminal Cases, (11th ed. 1935) sec. 890.
(Georgia is not listed but see Georgia, Code 1933, sec. 38-109 requiring that
convictions based on circumstantial evidence "exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of guilt of the accused.")0 3 Beside the backhand way in which the rule is stated with the ex-
clusion first (see note 101 supra) note the following part of the definition
which preceded the part quoted in note 101: "By 'reasonable doubt' is in-
tended not fanciful or ingenious doubt or conjecture but substantial, honest,
conscientious doubt suggested by the material evidence, or lack of it, in the
case. It is an honest, substantial misgiving, generated by insufficiency of
proof. It is not a captious doubt, nor a doubt suggested by the ingenuity
of counsel or court and unwarranted by the testimony; nor a doubt born of
a merciful inclination to permit the defendant to escape conviction; nor a
doubt prompted by sympathy for him or those connected with him." M. C. M.
par. 78.
So. too, the Manual adopts the rule as to reasonable doubt to every
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rule adopted is natural, for if the distinction between proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt and proof by preponderance of the evi-
dence has any vitality it should have more before a trained board
than a lay jury.104
We thus have a situation where, in spite of this feeble attempt
to correct it by amplifying the definition,105 a person in time of
war and in the face of great emergency may be returned armed to
a focal point of danger even though the preponderance of evidence
indicates he - as guilty of, say aiding the enemy or acting as a
spy.
Two solutions suggest themselves; the adoption of one or the
other seems imperative. The simpler, and one which we prefer
would be in time of war or possibly only in time of great emer-
gency to relax the burden of proof generally, or at least as to war
offenses, to that of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
The second, which could be adopted if the reasonable doubt rule
is viewed as furnishing a necessary safeguard, is to allow the
court to prevent the return of certain accused persons to positions
where they could do harm. Details of this latter, which would
have to be worked out, would involve a verdict of "not proven,"
which would place military personnel in some sort of guarded
labor battalion, and others in internment or other custody for the
duration of the war.
Allied to the question of the burden of proof is the number of
members of a court who must be persuaded. The present rule is
that the death penalty requires concurrence of all members present
when the vote is taken, 106 confinement in excess of ten years con-
currence of three-fourths,10 7 and other convictions two-thirds of
the members so present.' m Other questions are determined by a
majority vote.10 9
Where the number required for a finding of guilty do not
concur the finding must be not guilty. 10 This is utterly absurd.
element of the offense. Ibid. The general rule in criminal law is contra to
this. 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 2497.O'lSee Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof, as Given by Logic, Psy-
chology, and General Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials (3d ed.
1937) sees. 310, 341; 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) sec. 2497.
105See note 103 supra.
'OA. W. 43.
107A. W. 43.
10SA. W. 43.
'OA. W. 43.
"
0
"A finding of not guilty results as to any specification or charge if
no other valid finding is reached thereon." M. C. M%. par. 78d. Furthermore
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It is as if a "hung" jury were considered as finding for the de-
fendant."' Taken in connection with the rule against double
jeopardy it gives a safeguard, especially great in cases where the
death penalty is mandatory,11 2 far beyond that given in any crim-
inal law. Carried to its logical conclusion it would restore to
armed duty, or in the case of civilians allow freedom, to persons of
whose guilt the majority of members of a court-martial were con-
vinced even beyond a reasonable doubt. Some provision should,
of course, be adopted either to allow decisions by a simple majority
in war time" 3 or to provide for retrials of those defendants for
whom at least a majority of the court did not vote a finding of not
guilty." 4 The first of these is best fitted for times of great emer-
gency, while the second would give a greater safeguard where
the situation admits of some delay. The defect is so apparent that
we consider it inexcusable negligence not to correct it.
13. APPEAL OR OTHER REVIEW
Four appellate bodies review convictions by general court-
martial. Every such conviction is subject to review by at least two
and often three of these.
A. The officer holding general court-martial jurisdiction over
the offender, together with his staff judge advocate, constitute the
first reviewing authority."15 This officer is generally the one who
appointed the court," 6 and is usually at least a division con-
where a two-thirds or three-fourths requirement results in a fraction the
required fraction will be counted as an additional one. Ibid.
"'The rule in criminal cases is that a disagreement is not an acquittal
and that the proper discharge of a jury which cannot agree "constitutes no
bar to further proceedings." United States v. Perez, (1824) 9 Wheat.
(U.S.) 579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165; Keerl v. Montana, (1909) 213 U. S. 135,
29 Sup. Ct. 469, 53 L. Ed. 734.
112Acting as a spy in violation of Article of 'War 82 is such an offense:
hence each member of the court has power to acquit. In all other war
offenses punishable by "death or such other punishment as a court-martial
may direct" one vote can defeat the death sentence while a vote of more
than one-third but less than a majority of the members present can prevent
any conviction or punishment.
"'3This would be the efficient way. That it prevents retrials is evident.
Cf. the less than unanimous verdicts in civil cases. New York Civil Practice
Act (1920) sec. 463-a, added Laws 1937, ch. 120 (allowing verdicts in civil
cases by five-sixths of the jurors.)
114This slight recast of the criminal rule allowing retrials in all cases of
disagreements, see note 111 supra, is suggested so as to avoid multitudinous
retrials and out of general confidence in courts-martials as experts.
"'A. W. 46.
116M. C. Af. par. 87a. It might, however, be his successor in command.
A. N1. 46
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mander."n  No sentence of a general court-martial may be carried
out without review by this officer, who must act only after refer-
ence to his staff judge advocate or, if none there be, to the Judge
Advocate General." 5 The weight of the evidence may be consid-
ered on this review."" Sentence may be mitigated or remitted.
2 0
Errors involving evidence, pleading or procedure may be disre-
garded unless they "injuriously affected the substantial rights of
an accused."12  A sentence may be suspended in whole or in
part.1 2
2
Though appeals do not lie from findings of not guilty, the
appointing authority may by letter point out errors, for the
future guidance of the court.1
22
B. The Board of Review in the Judge Advocate General's
Office,1 24 followed by action by the judge advocate general, con-
stitute the second reviewing group in the more serious cases. They
consider three types of cases. First, are cases which because of
the grave nature of the offense will eventually require confirma-
tion of the sentence by the president of the United States.22 This
includes cases affecting a general, involving the dismissal of any
officer or cadet, or any death sentence.12 6 In time of war they also
consider sentences involving dismissal of an officer, and certain
death sentences which may in lieu of confirmation by the president
be confirmed by the commanding general of an army in the field,
of a territorial department or of a division.127
Next, the Board of Review considers other convictions by
general court-martial in which the sentence involves at least dis-
missal, dishonorable discharge not suspended, or confinement in
a penitentiary. 2 8 These cases of intermediate gravity are then
reviewed by the judge advocate general.' 2' Only when the judge
advocate general and the reviewing board differ as to whether or
217A. W. 8 (the commanding officer of a separate brigade can also
appoint a gtneral court-martial. A. A~r. 46).
118A. W. 46.
1'M. C. M. par. 87b.
12AM. C. M. par. 87b.
222 M. C. M. par. 87b; A. W. 37.
22A. W. 52.
1231N. C. M. par. 87b.
124A. W. 507%.
125A. W. 50 %.
1213A. W. 48.
1'7A. W. 48(b) and (d).
2 A. W. 50%.
120A. W. 5012.
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not the decision should be approved are these cases sent to the
secretary of war for action by the president. 130 In the usual case
wherein they agree, they exercise final appellate jurisdiction,' 3'
though their decision unlike that of the first reviewing authority
is confined to errors of law. 132
Lastly the Board of Review considers those cases in which the
record of trial by general court-martial has been found legally
insufficient in routine examination in the Judge Advocate General's
office. 133 These cases are referred to the judge advocate general
if the board, too, finds the record legally insufficient to support the
findings and sentence. 3 4 He in turn forwards the record together
with his recommendation to the secretary of war for action by
the president. 33
C. The section officers conducting routine review in the Judge
Advocate General's Office constitute the third reviewing body.
They consider all records of trial by general court-martial which
do not go directly to the Board of Review. 30 Where no error is
detected this ends the case.
D. Review by the president is the fourth type of review. In
accordance with decided policy the secretary of war usually acts
for the president.' 3 7 Cases not governed by previously set policy
may, however, come directly before the President.138 Three types
of cases already discussed have this type of review. 39
Our first observation is the technical failure to achieve symmet-
rical uniformity. Possibly this is due to the fact that the provi-
sions were enacted at different times. 4 0 Whatever the cause, the
130A. vWr. 50%.
'131A. W. 50%.
3Note in M. C. M. to A. W. 50Y citing court-martial No. 152797:
". if the record of trial contains any evidence which, if true, is sufficient
to support the findings of guilty, the board of review and the judge advo-
cate general are not permitted by law, for the purpose of finding the record
not legally sufficient to support the findings, to consider as established such
facts as are inconsistent with the findings even though there be uncontra-
dicted evidence of such facts."
33A. W. 50Y2.
134A. W. 50%.
"35A. W. 50.
138 A. W. 50%.
'37(1877) 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 291; (1882) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 397.
"3SRunkle v. United States, (1887) 122 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 1141,
30 L. Ed. 1167.
1391. Those of exceptional gravity; 2. Those wherein the Board of Re-
view and the judge advocate general differ. 3. Lesser cases wherein routine
examination and the Board of Review have both found the record legally
insufficient. See A. W. 50 Y.
140A. W. 50Y2 enacted in the codification of 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 797,
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most glaring error of this type lies in the fact that the Board of
Review, with the concurrence of the judge advocate general, can
in important cases coming to it in the first instance vacate the
finding and return the case for whatever rehearing is necessary,
but cannot do so in less important cases which come to it because
of error detected in the routine review.14' These less important
cases in which the sentence is less than confinement in a peniten-
tiary must, though the routine reviewer, the Board of Review and
the judge advocate general all detect error, nevertheless go to the
secretary of war for action by the president.
1 42
Next, the machinery is fully as cumbersome as appellate
criminal procedure,143 which has often been the subject of criti-
cism. 144 Even though the lawyer's part in military review is less
than in a criminal appeal, this does not necessarily reduce delay
by making the reviewer's task easier.145 Indeed the work is more,
for the first reviewing body may consider the weight of the evi-
dence to a greater extent than is generally allowed in criminal
appeals. 48
The gist of the problem as it would be affected by wartime
conditions lies in the double and triple review now required. A
single automatic review as of right in all cases wherein confine-
ment in a penitentiary or death is ordered should be enough. This
review, confined to errors of law, should be by a board of Judge
Advocate General Department officers. We can dispense with
review by the appointing authority. This officer in combat would
be beset with many duties, and time for judicial action on his part,
10 U. S. C. A. sec. 1522 was again amended in 1937, 50 Stat. at L. 724,
10 U. S. C. Supp. V sec. 1522. The articles enacted in much their present
form by Act Aug. 29, 1916 ch. 418, 39 Stat, at L. 658 did not contain the
important A. W. 50/2 which as noted grants important reviewing authority
to the Judge Advocate General's Office.
The other articles dealing with review (e.g. A.W. 46-53) were enacted
piecemeal beginning with the Act of April 10, 1806, 2 Stat. at L. 367.
See 4 U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) sec. 2308a notes to A. W. 46-53.141A. W. 50 .
142A. W. 50 .
143Orfield, The Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases, (1936) 34 Mich.
L. Rev. 937; Orfield, History of Criminal Appeal in England, (1936) 1 Mo.
L. Rev. 326.
1-4Taft, The Delays of the Law, (1908) 18 Yale L. J. 28; Orfield,
Criminal Appeals in America (1939) 122.
14"The oral argument when properly employed is an extremely effec-
tive aid in a correct decision." Report of Section of Judicial Administration
of the American Bar Association (1938) 101 quoted in Orfield, Criminal
Appeals in America (1939).
141M. C. M. par. 87b.
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even with the aid of his staff judge advocate, would be hard to
find. In view of the great speed of modern war, and in view of
the fact that certainty of punishment is a great deterrent, it might
be well to consider regulations under which the commander of an
army or territorial department, in times of great stress and for
purely wartime offenses, could suspend all review and order all
sentences carried out summarily.
After parliamentary debate Great Britain in the provisions of
the Emergency Power (Defense) (no. 2) Act, to go into effect
upon invasion, decided against this abolition of appeal and in
favor of the single speedy review.147 We feel, however, that some
limited use of the type just suggested of the no appeal 48 principle
may be needed. A possible compromise in times of great emer-
gency would be a speedy discretionary review similar to the Su-
preme Court's review by certiorari. 149 This could be worked out
so as to amount to quasi-judicial as distinguished from an admin-
istrative suspension of review.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of the military, with its consequent extension of
military jurisdiction, which is necessary if this country is to re-
147Regulations made pursuant to the Emergency Powers Defense Acts
1939 and 1940, Comparative Law Series, July 1940, 394 divided Great
Britain into thirteen regional areas each with commissioners who in the event
of attack will take over. In the event any region is cut off from the govern-
ment through enemy action their authority will become practically unlimited.
Provisions in the bill as introduced in the House to make their rulings free
from review were deleted. Sturges, London Letter, (1940) 26 A. B. A. J.
802, 803-4, New York Times Aug. 20, 1940. The decision in favor of review
is in accord with the general British treatment of defense regulations. See
Butterworths, Emergency Legislation Service (1940) Title 13, Regulation
2A creating the offense of acts done with intent to assist the enemy, which
was amended by S. R. & 0. 1940 No. 669. May 9, 1940, by adding a pro-
vision that "A person shall not be summarily convicted of an offense against
this Regulation" to clear up doubts as to the method of procedure. Even
after conviction on indictment the maximum penalty cannot exceed two years
imprisonment and a fine of £500! Id. Regulation 92.
Cf. the belated adoption of the no appeal principle by France: The
Vichy Government is applying this in the trials by "Cour Martiale" of those
charged with aiding General de Gaulle. They are tried forty-eight hours
after arrest and judgment executed twenty-four hours later without appeal.
N. Y. Times September 25, 1940, p. 4.
148At one time Taft advocated a great reduction if not a total abolition
of appeals in criminal cases. See Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law,
(1905) 15 Yale L. J. 1.
149Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America (1939) 52, advocates this type
of appeal in criminal cases generally "If the appellant was substantially
prejudiced, the court is likely to discover the fact. Frivolous appeals are
thus discouraged at the outset." The errors alleged would be considered on
abbreviated statements without the necessity of reviewing the whole record.
CIVIL SAFEGUARDS BEFORE COURTS-MARTIAL 345
main great, makes immediately important consideration of the law
governing our military establishment. 1' ° The whole nation, and
not just the administrative department governed thereby, may
be affected by efficiency of our military law. The induction into
the service of a large number of draftees5 15 will without doubt
necessitate some change in the Manual for Courts-Martial as re-
gards the punishment of dishonorable discharge. 52 The discharge
will in many cases have to be suspended until the termination of
the draft period, and allowable limits of other punishments in-
creased to take the place of this normally severe punishment. This
seems necessary, as dishonorable discharge would not be the de-
terrent with many draftees that it is with career soldiers.
This is thus the logical time for a thoroughgoing revision of
court-martial procedure. We recommend that the Articles of War
and the Manual for Courts-Martial be revised so as to accomplish
the following:
1. Allow the prosecution to use depositions when necessary in
the trial of all cases in war time.
2. Eliminate repetition while the same court is sitting of the
oath required of the court personnel.
3. Widen the scope of cross-examination so as to include any
relevant issue.
4. Make admissible in evidence hearsay statements by wit-
nesses since deceased.
5. Make civilian acts harmful to the military objective triable
by courts-martial.
6. Provide in the case of large commands for judicially fitted
officers acquiring administrative expertness by functioning as a
continuing court.
7. Eliminate even the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
by United States Courts in time of great emergency.
S. Do not allow trial by court martial to prevent later civil pun-
ishment by federal courts.
9. Abolish in time of great emergency appeals by the accused
from a refusal to assign the person requested as military counsel.
10. Abolish at least in war time the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.
11. In time of great emergency relax the burden of proof to
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
12. Provide for retrials where there is neither a conviction nor
'50"The underlying necessity of national self-preservation exists in time
of peace as well as after war has been declared." Mickelwait, Legal Basis
for Conscription, (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 701.15 Selective Training Service Act of 1940, (54 Stat. at L.)
"
2
1See table of offenses so punishable f. C. M. par. 104c.
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a majority vote of not guilty and in time of great emergency allow
conviction by a simple majority.
13. In war time limit review to a single reviewing body con-
sidering only cases involving at least penitentiary confinement;
in time of great emergency abolish all review by order of the
commander or discretionary action by the reviewing body.
As the situation stands today court-martial procedure is for
the most part a fairly good carbon copy of the practice in our
criminal courts. Of the fifteen safeguards we discussed only
three"5 are greatly relaxed by present procedure. Eleven,' 5 as
seen by our recommendations, could be profitably reexamined; in
the case of five of the safeguards'55 revision, as suggested in our
recommendations 4, 5, 10, 12 and 13, is vital. We do not claim
our categories of safeguards exclusive and as others come to
mind' " ' other changes will doubtless suggest themselves. Speed of
administration and certainty of punishment for the guilty are the
two central thoughts we have in mind.
This need of speed is the reason for the third category of
"great emergency" which we added in five' 57 of our recommenda-
tions to that of war and peace. This concept of super war almost
received legislative recognition.' 5' Constituting more than war or
emergency it involves a situation where other considerations than
the rights of an individual would weigh their greatest.1 9 For this
1535. Grand Jury and Jury Trial; 6. Habeas Corpus.
154Topics 2-8 and 11-13 supra.
'15 Topics 4, 5, 11, 12, 13.
'I-Some other safeguards which might be discussed: Public trial, trial
in place where offense committed, use of illegally obtained evidence, physi-
cian-patient & attorney-client privileges.
257Recommendations 7, 9, 11, 12 and 13 discussed in Topics 6, 8, 12
and 13.
258Thus the first draft of the Conference report on Selective Training
Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. at L., provided in the "draft industry" provision
so called for the government taking over on a leasing basis certain un-
cooperative plants after the President has found that "public danger is
immediate, imminent and impending, and the emergency in the public service
is extreme and imperative." This clearly meant more than emergency and
probably more than a technical state of war. Its inclusion in a provision
designed to operate if need be in peace time would have been unfortunate.
159"In this world of arms, constitutional civil rights will endure only if
protected by arms. The constitutional authority of the United States govern-
ment to wage war, being unrestricted, implies the full use of the war power.
That power is the power of necessity, than which none is greater. What
necessity requires, it justifies. Wherefore, not only upon the actual theater
of war, but wherever an emergency of war arises, the violation of every
civil constitutional right impeding the war power is justified, if necessary.
At peace, civil law should be absolute; at war, martial rule, wherever neces-
sary, must be absolute." Hatcher, Martial Law and Habeas Corpus: Extent
of War Power in Emergency, (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 375.
See Gilbert v. State of Minnesota, (1920) 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct.
125, 65 L. Ed. 287.
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reason we recommend that some of the more extensive changes be
made only in such times of "great emergency." This expression
was used to describe the situation prevailing during a great battle
or an invasion with definite penetration of holding lines. As we
used these terms we meant more than war being carried to our
own territory, for this alone does not preclude stabilized warfare.
What it is intended to portray is a situation such as confronted the
former French Republic after the break through, namely speedy
modern warfare requiring quick action. This added third cate-
gory of situations governed by different rules should be of help in
total warfare as meeting the challenge of totalitarianism with the
least, but not avoiding the necessary, sacrifice of the rights of the
individual.
